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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA TE OF UT AH
JOHN R. CHATTERLEY, ET AL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
vs.
OMNI CO, INC. and INTERFACE
COl\IPUTER, INC.,
Defendants and Appellant.

Case No.
12122

BRIEF O,F AP'P·ELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiffs to recover from
the Defendant, Interface Computer, Inc., unpaid wages,
expenses, prepaid insurance premiums and vacation
benefits incurred and earned while in the employ of
Interface, to recover said amounts from the Defendant,
Omnico, Inc., as having controlled and regulated the
business of Interface to such an extent as to be liable for
the obligations of Interface and to collect from said Defendants, alleged damages to Plaintiffs' credit reputation, together with penalty wages and attorney fees as
provided by Sections 34-28-5(1) and 34-27-1, UCA, 1953.
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to the Def enclant, Omni co, Inc., a Washington based
holding company, with the remaining 20% of the stock
being retained by McKay Smith (R. 395). On April 28,
1969, the Omnico Board of Directors, representing the
Interface shares held by Omnico, and McKay Smith, rep' resenting the remaining outstanding Interface shares,
met in a shareholders' meeting and therein elected
1'lcKay Smith and the membership of the Executive Committee of the Omnico Board of Directors to serve as the
Tnterface Board of Directors for the ensuing year. (Ex.
27-P, Part 3 of 19, pp. 3, 4). The newly elected Interface
Board did immediately thereafter and during the course
of that meeting, elect Eddie M. Peterson as Chairman of
the Interface Board and McKay Smith as President and
Chief Executive Officer of Interface. (Ex. 27-P, Part
3 or 19, pp. 3, 4). Peterson was also serving at this partienlar time as Chairman of the Omnico Board of Directors and as Chairman of the Board of each Omnico subsidiary company (Ex. 27-P, Part 3 of 19; R. 619).
The Plaintiffs, Chatterley, Hayward, Robert Hill,
Park and Foxley were employees of Interface at the date
that Omnico acquired its interest therein (R. 338, 205,
245, 315, 325). The remaining Plaintiffs were employed
by Interface on or after that date. (R. 216, 278, 302, 358,
363, 382). All Plaintiffs were hired by Interface officers
and personnel (R. 463).
Formerly elected Interface officers were initially
limited to Peterson and Smith who were elected during
the April 28, 1969 board meeting as Chairman of the
Board and President, respectively. However the Co3

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The trial court granted to Plaintiffs a Judgment
against the Defendant, Interface Computer, Inc., for unpaid wages, expenses, prepaid insurance premiums, vacation benefits and penalty wages totaling $35,411.00, and
against the Defendant, Omnico, Inc., for unpaid wages,
specific expenses, prepaid insurance premiums and vacation benefits totaling $14,441.00. Defendants subsequently moved the Court for a new trial and the motion was
denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Omni co, Inc., seeks a determination that
the evidence before the Trial Court was not sufficient
to support the Trial Court's decision that Omnico is
liable for unpaid wages, expenses and benefits earned
and incurred by Plaintiffs while in the employ of Interface Computer, Inc., and, further, seeks a reversal of
the court's judgment against Omnico.
Defendant seeks to sustain that part of the judgment denying Plaintiffs' claim against it for penalty
wages as provided by Section 34-28-5 (1), U CA, 1953.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, Interface Computer, Inc., is a Utah
corporation, incorporated on December 16, 1968 (Ex.
21-P) with the majority of its outstanding stock then
held by McKay Smith (R. 395). In April of 1969, (R.
392) 80% of the outstanding Interface shares were sold
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was responsible for the Interface employees and their
performance (R. 143) and for determining the nature of
the work which Interface would accept and the services
it would render to its customers (R. 587). He reported
to Peterson, (R. 512) but was personally responsible
for Interface operations and decisions with regard thereto (R. 629, 652). He directed sales (R. 447) and had
authority to hire and establish salaries, considering the
recommendations of an Omnico Compensation Committee, as to any monthly salaries of $1,000.00 or more (R.
189, 628). He had authority to terminate Interface employees and did so on occasion (R. 155) without submitting the matter for approval (R. 170). Peterson never
hired nor terminated an Interface employee (R. 628),
Ret any of the Plaintiffs' salaries or directed Chatterley
to hire or terminate a given individual (R. 575, 588),
although on one occasion and incident to a directive received from the Omnico Board of Directors, he inquired
of Chatterley whether Interface could cut its work force
by 20% and still function, was advised it could and requested that Chatterley and Robert Hill proceed to effect
their planned cutback ( R. 624, 625). Chatterley effected
some of the planned terminations and withheld others
because of objections received from McKay Smith (R.
573, 574). Peterson inquired as to the reason why all
terminations were not affected, but did not at any time
insist that they be made (R. 575).
Interface funds were handled and deposited by Lorin
''Bill" Anderson (R. 514), Comptroller of Omnico (R.
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Plaintiff, John Chatterley, served as, and considered
himself to be, the Executive Vice President and General
Manager of Interface ( R. 135) and Peterson recognized
and confirmed that he so held and was responsible for
this particular office (R. 588). The Co-Plaintiff, Robert
Hill, also served as a Vice President (R. 140, 260).
Initially, neither Chatterley nor Hill were formally elected as officers by the Interface Board but, rather, served
with the consent and recognition of the Board as evidenced by their direct dealings with Board Chairman, Peterson (R. 543, 588, 624, 625, 629). However, on August 27,
1969, Chatterley was formally elected by the Interface
Board to the office of Vice President and General Manager of Interface (Ex. 27-P, Part 5 of 19, p. 2).
As Chairman of the Board of Directors of Omnico
and of Interface and each of the other Omnico subsidiary
companies, Peterson was responsible for the maintenance
of Board policy and for assisting the President of each
subsidiary where advisable (R. 619-620). Smith, as President of Interface, correlated Interface policy between
Peterson and the Co-Plaintiff, Chatterley, (R. 437) who
was functioning as Vice President and General Manager
of Interface. Sometime between June and July, 1969,
Smith and Peterson agreed that Smith would devote his
time to research and development and that Chatterley
would report directly to Peterson (R. 426-428, 471).
Chatterley functioned as Vice Presdent and General
Manager of Interface, reporting to Smith initially and,
thereafter, directly to Peterson incident to the agreement
between Smith and Peterson (R. 122, 534). Chatterley
4
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companies, Omnico sought to coordinate activities between and centralize staff services for the subsidiary
companies in order to generate a greater combined company profit (Ex. 29-P; R. 582) which would, in turn,
increase its return from the stock in which it had invested. Incident thereto, various written memoranda were
issuPcl by Peterson in his capacity as Chairman of the
Omnico Board of Directors and the boards of Interface
and the other subsidiary companies (R. 645, 650). These
memoranda dealt with printing requirements (Ex. 31-P),
a meeting of the chief executives of each subsidiary company (Ex. 32-P), legal services (Ex. 36-P) and outside
purchases and hiring of new employees (Ex. 37-P). Such
were written under the Omnico letterhead or under none
at all, since all executive officers of the subsidiaries knew
that Peterson functioned as Chairman of the Board for
each company and the utilization of separate letterheads,
with separate designations as to Peterson's office, would
have been cumbersome and impractical (R. 649-650).
Peterson had conferred with Chatterley as to each memorandum before mailing the same (R. 630), except as to
that regarding legal procedures and his failure to here
confer was unusual (R. 580). An additional memorandum, relating to automobile telephones (Ex. 30-P) was
i:,;sued bv the Omnico Comptroller, then serving as Comptroller for Interface (R. 514, 650, 665 ), after having first
gained the approval of Chatterley, Peterson and McKay
Rmith (R. 576, 577, 665 ).
Interface did not meet the salaries of its employees
for the first two weeks in October, 1969 (R. 142, 546). On
approximately October 17, 1969 (R. 142), Plaintiffs met
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563, 650) who initially performed comptroller duties for
Interface and the other Omnico subsidiary companies
and on August 27, 1969, was elected by the Interface
Board to serve as Comptroller of Interface (Ex. 27-P,
Part 5 of 19, p. 2; R. 644, 645). Anderson looked directly
to the Interface Vice Pre:;:;ident, John Chatterley, for
supervision ( R. 670 - 671). Interface checks written
against the Interface bank account were signed by Chatterley, along wth either Smith, Peterson or Anderson
(R. 161, 513) all of whom were authorized signatories,
(Ex. 39-P). No portion of the income or profits generated
hy Interface were ever paid or deposited to the account
of Omnico (R. 631).
During the period of time in which Omnico was an
Interface shareholder, Interface maintained its own offices and place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.
135), hired its own employees and set their salaries (R.
463) and paid those salaries only by checks issued on
Interface accounts (R. 152). During this period, certain
loans were made by Omnico to Interface, including those
in amounts of $9,000.00 (R. 602), $11,065.00 (R. 562) and
$15,000.00 (R. 595, 596) and were reflected in the Omnico
financial statements as interest drawing accounts receivable (R. 665-666) and in the Interface statements as notes
payable (R. 679). Although these loans were not reduced
to promissory notes, Omnico 's Treasurer had been, on
numerous occasions, instructed to so reduce them, but
had failed to do

RO

(R. 669).

In its capacity as a holding company retaining a
majority interest in Interface and the other subsidiary
6

On or about November 6, 1969, Plaintiffs, Chatterley
and Hill, together with their attorney, met with Richard
Simon (R. 475, 490, 507) the recently elected Chairman
of the Omnico Board of Directors (R. 475; Ex. 27-P,
Part 17 of 19, p. 3) and presented to him a written claim
for wages, vacation benefits, certain specified expenses,
and prepaid insurance premiums allegedly owing by
Interface to Plaintiffs (R. 475; Exhibit 28-P), which
claim did not properly reflect the correct amounts due
and owing from Interface (R. 475, 476) and was not
honored or paid by either Omnico or Interface. This action was thereafter filed by Plaintiffs on November 21,
1969, to recover a different amount of wages, vacation
henefits, expenses and prepaid insurance premiums (Ex.
1-P).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT, INTERFACE COMPUTER, INC., DID NOT HAVE
A VALID BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
VALIDLY ELECTED OFFICERS.
Shortly after acquiring its 80% interest in Interface,
the Omnico Board of Directors, representing the Interface shares held by Omni co, met in a shareholders' meeting with McKay Smith who held the remaining Interface
shares then outstanding. Together, and representing all
outstanding Interface stock, they therein elected the
Omnico Board Executive Committee, of which McKay
9

with other Interface employees and formulated certain
demands set down in writing under the direction of the
Co-Plaintiff, Robert E. Hill, (Ex. 5-D) and mailed by
him to Mack Call, the acting President of Omnico (R.
547, 549) and to Peterson and the Co-Plaintiff, Chatterley (R. 549). No response was received from either
Peterson or Omnico (R. 549).
On approximately October 24, 1969, (R. 440) McKay
Smith, assuming himself to be the President of Interface
and thereby duly authorized (R. 443) aud asserting some
contractual violation of the Omnico-Interface Purchase
Agreement (R. 662), proceeded without direction or
authority of the Omnico or Interface Boards of Directors
(R. 443, 444) and assumed operational control of Interface and requested and obtained the resignation of the
Co-Plaintiff, Chatterley (R. 440, 110, 111, 158). Thereafter, Mack Call, temporary President of Omnico and
a member of the Interface and Omnico Boards of Directors, (Ex. 27-P, Part 9 of 19, p. 2; R. 482) mailed out
written notices, dated October 29, 1969, advising the CoPlaintiffs, Robert Hill, Hayward, Perry, Watts and
Morrey, that their employment with Interface was terminated (Ex. 8-P, 9-P, 13-P, 18-P, 19-P). Such action
was taken without the consent or knowledge of McKay
Smith (R. 470) or the Omnico and Interface Boards of
Direcors, (R. 481). The remaining Plaintiffs, except for
Cathy Walters, who had voluntarily quit her job a few
days earlier (R. 373), all requested and received "blue
slip" separation notices from Interface (R. 679, 680, Ex.
7-P, 11-P, 15-P, 16-P, 20-P).
8

constituted and that its decisions were valid, the Court
held:
"The amendment increasing the number of the
directors from seven to nine did not alter the
character of the corporation, or in the least add
to or diminish the scope of its powers ... and is
not, therefore, fundamental." (Emphasis added}
21Utah10.
''Any amendment which changes the character of
the corporation, increases its powers, or is fundamental in other respects, must be likewise filed as
required by statute, but we fail to perceive any
reason why the failure to file an amendment
which is not fundamental, which in no way
changes the character of the corporation or the
scope of its powers, but simply increases the number of the agents, who shall act as directors in
carrying out the object of its creation, should
invalidate the acts of such agents, which are within the scope of the corporate power of the company .... " 21 Utah 12.
In electing the seven new directors for Interface,
the Omnico Board and McKay Smith were voting 100%
of the Interface shares. By increasing the size of the
Interface Board, they did by their vote, automatically
amend the Interface Articles, an amendment which was
not fundamental and, therefore, was not invalidated by
the corporation's failure to file its Articles of Amendment with the Utah Secretary of State. The new directors functioned as the duly elected and constituted Board
of Interface and their election of a Board Chairman and
President vested these officers with the legal rights and
authority to function as the legal officers of Interface
Computer, Inc.
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Smith was a member, to serve as the Board of Directors
for Interface. These Interface directors did thereafter
and during the course of the same meeting, elect Eddie
Peterson, the Omnico Board Chairman, as Chairman of
the Interface Board, and McKay Smith as President of
Interface (Ex. 27-P, Part 3 or 19, pp. 3, 4).
The Omnico Executive Committee which then served
as the Interface Board, consisted of seven members (R.
620), three more than the four member Board of
Directors provided for by Article IX of the Interface Articles of Incorporation (Ex. 21-P). The Trial
Court determined that since the directors elected to the
Interface Board exceeded the number provided in the
Interface Articles, that they did not constitute a valid
Board and could not validly transact business or elect
officers for the corporation and, therefore, that Interface
of necessity was guided and directed by the officers of
Omnico (R. 70, 694, 695).
In the case of Jackson v. The Crown Point Mining
Company, 21Utah1, 59 P. 238, this court was called upon
to determine whether an excessive number of directors
invalidated the actions taken by the Board. In that case,
the shareholders elected a total of nine directors while
the corporate articles provided for only seven. The plaintiff-respondent petitioned the Court to invalidate the actions of the newly constituted board, since the corporation had failed to comply with statutes and file an amendment to its Articles increasing the permitted number of
directors. In determining that the Board was legally

10

primarily predicated upon the existence of common officers and directors.
The general consensus of the courts in this country
is that the existence of common officers and directors is
not alone sufficient to render a holding company liable
on the contracts of its subsidiaries. 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, Secs. 17, 716. This position is emphasized in
the case of American Trading and Production Corporation v. Fischback and Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D.
Illinois, E. D.), wherein the Court said:
"Neither ownership of all of the stock of a subsidiary, nor identity of officers and directors,
nor both combined are sufficient to justify 'piercing the corporate veil.' Such factors are common
business practice and exist in most parent and
subsidiary relationships." 311 F. Supp. 415
Clearly in order to justify piercing the corporate
veil of the subsidiary, the influence exercised by the
parent corporation over the subsidary must be something other than that which it may properly exercise pursuant to its majority control of shares and the existence
of common officers and directors.
The Court in the American Trading and Prod. Corp.
case observed:
''The additional factors which must be present
have been variously described as direct intervention in the subsidiary's affairs, the act of operation of the subsidiary's business, or the exercise
of control, not the opportunity to exercise control.'' 311 F. Supp 415.

13

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT, OMNICO,
INC., CONTROLLED 'f II E DEFENDANT.
INTERFACE COMPUTER, INC.
,
The universally recognized presumption is that the
corporation and its stockholders are separate and distinct entities. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol.
1, Section 41.3. Therefore, a parent or holding company
is generally not liable for the obligations of its subsidiary
companies. 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, Sec. 716. However, and as stated by this Court in Shaw v. BaileyM cCun,e Company, 11 Utah 2d 93, 355 P.2d 321:
''Under some circumstances the corporate entity
may be disregarded in the interest of justice, ill
such cases as frarud, contravention, of law or contract or public wrong. How ever, great caution
should be exercised by the Court in disregarding
the entity." (Emphasis added) 11 Utah 2d 95
In the instant case, the Interface directors were also
directors of Omnico, its Board Chairman was also Chairman of the Omnico Board and 80% of its shares were
held by Omnico. As a result, Interface shareholder and
board meetings were held in conjunction with Omnico
board meetings for convenience purposes. Such meetings,
although serving a real practical purpose, were confusing to the Trial Court and persuaded it to determine that
the Interface directors and officers, even if validly elected, bad not functioned during the period in question (R.
70, 71, 694, 695). In other words, the trial court's decision
that Omnico controlled Interface appears to have been

12

of its General Manager, Interface directed its own sales
'
negotiated for and determined the nature of the work
it would accept and the services it would render to its
customers. In short, it controlled its own business and
operations. No portion of Interface income and profits
were ever deposited or paid to Omnico. Interface maintained separate bank accounts and retained the authority
to draw checks thereon under the signature of its General
:'.\ianager, together with the signatures of either its President or Board Chairman. Loans made by Omnico to
Interface were reflected on the books of both companies
as amounts owing by Interface to Omnico. Such loans
1rnuld have been reduced to promissory notes, but for
the omissions of the Omnico Treasurer. Chatterley, by
his own admission, was responsible for Interface operations, reporting and looking to the Interface Board Chairman, Peterson, only for counsel and advice. Peterson
properly functioned as the Interface Board Chairman
and any advice and counsel given to Chatterley was
properly within the scope of Peterson's responsibility
as an Interface officer. However, and even assuming
that Peterson functioned only as an officer of Omnico,
the record fails to disclose that any directive or order
was ever given by him to Chatterley, with the exception
of certain written memoranda which he periodically issued. These memoranda to Chatterley and the other subsidiary heads related to consolidation of printing and
legal services, an Executive Council meeting of subsidiary heads, and future outside purchases and hiring of
personnel by the subsidiary companies. All were direct0d in an attempt to centralize accounting and to decrease

15

In Lowendahl v. Baltimo1 e and Oh,io R. Co., 247 App.
Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, affirmed 272 N. Y. 360, 6 N.E.
2d 56, rehearing denied 273 N.Y. 584, 7 N.E. 2d 704,
the Court determined that :
"Liability (of the parent corporation) must depend upon a domination and control (of the subsidiary) so complete that the (latter) may be said
to have no will, mind, or existence of its own and
to be operated as a mere department of the business of the p a r e n t corporation.'' (bracketed
phrases added) 287 N.Y.S. 73
The record evidences that Interface handled the
employment, supervision and termination of its O\Vn employees through the offices of its General Manager, the
Co-Plaintiff, John Chatterley. No Interface employee
was ever hired or terminated by Omnico, although in
August, 1969, a memorandum from the Omnico and Interface Board Chairman, Peterson, indicated that all future
hirings of personnel would require the approval of
Omnico officers. However, there is no evidence that
compliance with this memorandum was ever required
or that Omnico ever supervised or attempted to influence
the hiring of any Interface employee. Chatterley established all employee salaries, although Peterson did
request that he consider the recommendation of the
Omnico Board's Compensation Committee as to the more
substantial salaries paid. However, Chatterley retained
the right of final decision in this matter. All Interface
salaries were paid from Interface funds, none of said
salaries having been paid by Omnico. Through the office

14

POINT III
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DEFENDANTS, OMNI CO, INC. AND INTERFACE,
COMPUTER, INC., DID NOT RESULT IN
FRAUD, INJUSTICE OR UNFAIRNESS TO
THE PLAINTH'FS.
Even if Omnico had, in fact, exercised control over
Interface, such control did not perpetrate any unfairness
or injustice upon Plaintiffs sufficient to obligate Omnico
on Plaintiffs' claims against Interface. As observed by
the Court in Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronaulical
poration, 324 F.2d 157, 160 (7th Cir. 1963):

''In order to establish that a subsidiary is the
mere instrumentality of its parent, three elements
must be proved: control by the parent to such a
degree that the subsidiary has become its mere
instrumentality; fraud or wrong by the parent
through its subsidiary ... ; and unjust loss or
injury to the claimant, such as insolvency of the
subsidiary.''
In the American Trading and Prod. Corp. case,
supra, the necessity of finding more than just "control"
was also stressed. Therein, the Court said:
'' ... even if it could be said that the subsidiary
were the mere instrumentality of the parent, that
circumstance by itself would not justify imposition of liability. For it has long been the law that
the corporate entity is only ignored when the ends
of justice require it. Some element of unfairness,
something akin to fraud or deception, or the existence of a compelling public interest must be
present in order to disregard the corporate fiction." 311 F. Supp. 416.
17

expenses c>ommon to all companies and represented areas
of proper concern to any shareholder and which Omnico,
as a majority shareholder, was ahle to enforce at least
in part. Again, there is no indication that Omnico ever
directed, supervised or disallowed any purchases by Interface or the employment of Interface personnel or
made any attempts in this direction. The only other purported directive issued by Omnico was the July 1st
memorandum on automobile telephones which was issued
by Bill Anderson, the acting Comptroller of Interface,
and which reflected the prior decision of the Interface
officers, Chatterley, Smith and Peterson.
The record evidences that, at most, Omnico only attempted to exercise supervision and guidance of the
general performance of Interface but did not operate the
Interface business as such. Omnico did not negotiate
contracts, formulate bids or jobs, hire or fire or pay the
salaries of Interface employees or supervise the manner
in which Interface performed its jobs or services for customers. In other words, there was no direct intervention
in the affairs of Interface, no operation of its business
and no domination and control so complete that Interface
retained no will, mind or existence of its own. At most,
Omnico enjoyed only the opportuuity to exercise control.
rrhere in fact was no control.

16

any way or to any extent generated or enhanced by the
activities fo Omnico or its officers.
The record contains testimony both alleging and
denying that Richard Simon, the newly elected Omnico
Board Chairman, had represented to Plaintiff's representatives that Omnico was responsible for and would,
in fact, pay Plaintiffs' claims against Interface. Simon
himself denied such representations (R. 476). In any
event, the conversations in question occurred after the
Plaintiffs' claims had arisen and after their employment
with Interface was terminated. Plaintiffs, therefore,
could not possibly have sustained any part of the claimed damages as a result of any reliance on these alleged
representations.
There was nothing before the trial court which would
indicate that any part of Plaintiffs' claimed damages
were sustained incident to activities of the Defendant,
Omnico, or incident to reliance upon any of its representations. The activities engaged in by Omnico did not to
any extent constitute a fraud upon Plaintiffs or a contravention of law or contract or public wrong.
The Defendant, Omni co, Inc., respectfully submits
that its activities and relationship with Interface Computer, Inc. did not represent any injustice or unfairness
to Plaintiffs nor result in any damage to them and that
the Trial Court erred in awarding to Plaintiffs a Judgment against said Defendant.

19

This Court has itself limited the disregard of the corporate entity to '' ... such cases as fraud, contravention
of law or contract or public wrong" Shaw v. Bailey,
supra. at 95, and has conditioned such disregard upon the
necessity '' . . . to prevent fraud and accomplish justice .... " Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 273, 9P.2d 396,
398.
The record evidences that all of the Plaintiffs herein were either employees of Interface at the time Omnico
acqured its interest therein or were employed shortly
thereafter by Interface officers and personnel. None
were hired by Omnico nor at its request or directive.
None accepted employment by Interface on the pretext
that Omnico would pay their salaries or benefits or
guarantee payment of the same. The record is completely
devoid of any evidence that Omnico ever suggested, let
alone agreed, that it would cover Plaintiffs' salaries.
Obviously, the Plaintiffs were aware of Omnico 's majority interest in and opportunity to control Interface and,
therefore, may well have assumed that Omnico would
meet their salaries if Interface was not able to do so.
This is indicated by the "demands" formulated by Plaintiffs in their October, 1969, employees' meeting and subsequently forwarded to Omnico and Interface officers.
The Co-Plaintiff, Robert Hill, prepared and forwarded
that list of demands and himself testified that no response was ever received from Peterson or Omnico (R.
549). Not one of the Plaintiffs worked a day or remained on the job incident to a request from Omnico. In
short, the damages sought by the Plaintiffs were not in
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In the instant case, Omnico refused Plaintiffs' demands for payment, not merely because of a dispute as
to the amount owing, but because Omnico entertains a
bona fide belief that there existed no employer-employee
relationship between it and the Plaintiffs. Neither of
the Plaintiffs had at anytime been interviewed, hired
or paid a salary by Omnico. They at no time rendered
labor or services to, or for, Omnico or operated under
the supervision of Omnico personnel. Only the Plaintiff,
John Chatterley, testified that he reported or answered
to an Omnico official, and this particular official, Eddie
Peterson, "\Vas the Interface Board Chairman, properly
functioning as an Interface officer. The "termination
letters'' received by certain of the Plaintiffs from the
acting Omnico President, Mack Call, were intended to
prevent Plaintiffs from continuing their employment
with Interface under the misunderstanding that their
future salaries would be paid by Omnico (R. 666, 667).
In short, there did not exist any of the factors characteriRtic of an employer-employee relationship which would
have indicated to Omnico that it was, in fact, liable to
Plain tiffs on the claims presented. Omnico, therefore,
was justified in withholding payments on Plaintiffs'
claim while awaiting a judicial determination of the
nature of its relationship with Plaintiffs.
Defendant, Omni co, Inc., respectfully submits that
the penalty provisions of the subject Statute apply only
to circumstances in which there exists no bona fide dispute as to the existence of an actual employer-employee
relationship and that the decision of the Trial Court
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE DEFIGNDANT, OMNICO,
INC., FOR PENALTY WAGES PROVIDED
BY SECTION 34-28-5(1), UCA, 1953.
The Trial Court refused to award judgment aginst
Omnico for the penalty wages provided by Section 34-285 (1), UCA, 1953 (erroneously cited in Plaintiffs' Complaint as Section 34-10-6, UCA, 1953, then repealed), determining that the Statute was intended only to imposr
a penalty upon an employer refusing to pay wages which
that employer knew to be due and owing to his employee,
and that the record did not evidence that such knowledge
had been entertained by the officers or agents of Omnico
(R. 699).
In State v. J.B. & R. E. lValker, 100 Utah 523, 116P.
2d 766, this court was required to consider the application and purpose of a similar statute, since repealed, imposing a penalty on an employer for failure to pay wages
due, owing and demanded. The Court said:
''The evident purpose of the act is to assure to
employees prompt payment ... of the wages they
are entitled to receive." (Emphasis added) 100
Utah 531.
Conversely, the Court appears to have been saying, that
the Statute is not intended to assure prompt payment
of that which is merely claimed but rather that which is
a just obligation of the employer.
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should be affirmed insofar as it denies the application
of the Statute to said Defendant.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT TO CERTAIN OF THE
PLAINTIFFS FOR WAGES AND VACATION BENEFITS IN EXCESS OF THAT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Authorities agree that an employee is bound to exercise faithful, loyal and honest service to his employer.
Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corporation, 17 Utah 2d
425, 427, 413 P.2d 891; 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, Sec. 199.
It is further agreed that it is the duty of an employee
to be obedient to the directions of his employer. Evwns
v. Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 313, 410 P. 2d 999; 35 Am .Jnr,
Master and Servant, Sec. 83.
The record evidences that on approximately October
17, 1969, Plaintiffs met together as Interface employees
and formulated certain "demands" which were forwarded to Interface and Omnico officers (R. 142, 547, 549).
These demands were set forth in the recorded minutes
of that meeting and were before the Trial Court as Exhibit 5-D. Therein, the Plaintiffs indicated that all were
taking a temporary leave of absence until their designated conditions were met, and that they would thereafter
put in only that time on the job as necessary to complete
the work then in production (Exhibit 5-D). No response
was received to the "demands" as submitted (R. 549)
and Plaintiffs proceeded to report to work and perform
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their respecitve employment responsibilities as outlined
in ther ''demands.'' The Plantiff, Hayward, testified
that between October 17th and his alleged termination
date, that he worked only 95% of his regular working
days, having solicited two separate job interviews with
other prospective employers during this time (R. 208).
John Hill only worked approximately one-half of the
regular working day, reporting only to work those parkular jobs "needing to be run" (R. 288, 289). Perry
did not work a full eight hours each day, only being there
to "take care of the work that had to be done" and, in
fact, failed to report at all on October 30th (R. 311, 312).
Foxley worked all but three hours of the last Friday in
October, his absence being attributed to a job interview
with another prospective employer (R. 329). Watts failed
to report for work every day, but rather only when called
in by his supervisor (R. 362). The record further eviclences that Plaintiffs, Park and Johnson, also participated in interviews for new employment during the course
of the last week of their employment by Interface (R.
320, 321, 384), and that Robert Hill traveled to Los
Angeles on company time for the principle purpose of
demonstrating to Plaintiffs that he was working in their
he st interests (R. 250, 251).
Interface had established a policy, requiring that
timeslips be prepared by certain of its employees engaged in direct programming work for customers. These
timeslips were used to report the time spent on each
programming job in order that the company could more
accurately bill its customers for the work performed (R.
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ployees busy (R. 157) and that this work was not getting
done (R. 158). Plaintiffs were obviously prejudicing their
company's attempts to operate at a profit and, in fact,
constituted obstacles to the attaining of that purpose.
The further failure of certain of the employees to prepare the required timeslips clearly constituted a default
in thf>ir responsibilities as employees and at least, to
some extent, must have complicated the billing of customers and may well have reduced the amounts for which
the company could bill. These particular activities properly constituted a breach of the conditions of employment
under which these Plaintiffs were employed, and are
sufficient to deny Plaintiffs any right to compensation
or vacation benefits after the date of the October 17,
1969 meeting. Even in the event that this Court should
determine that the hereinabove described activities were
not sufficient to deny Plaintiffs' claims for wages and
vacation benefits accruing after October 17th, such wages
and benefits are properly payable only for the time on
the job actually spent by the Plaintiffs and, therefore,
the Trial Court erred in awarding the Plaintiffs, Hayward, Robert Hill, John Hill, Perry, Foxley, Watts and
Walters full wage and vacation benefits for the period
following the October 17th meeting, since such employees
worked less than the full time contemplated by the terms
of their employment agreement.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court
should reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court to the
extent that it awards damages against Appellant and,
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376, 380, 381). If these slips were not prepared, it would
be necessary for the company to estimate its billings (R.
381). Logically, if timeslips were not prepared, the company could well have difficulty in determining its cost
of programming, and the amount to be properly billed
and, therefore, could lose substantial revenues. Although
timeslips ·were required of Plaintiffs, Hayward (R. 208),
Morrey (R. 368), Johnson (R. 384), Perry (R. 312),
Foxley (R. 329) and Watts (R. 362), Hayward, Morrey
and J ohnsou prepared them only for the first ·week
following the October 17th employee meeting (R. 209,
368, 384), Perry was not sure he ever prepared them
after the meeting (R. 312), Foxley failed to prepare
them for the last week of October (R. 329) and Watts
did not prepare them at all after the date of the employee
meeting (R. 362).
Section 469 of the Restatement of Agency (second)
provides as follows :
''An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of
his duty of loyalty; if such conduct constituted a
willful and deliberate breach of his contract of
service, he is not entitled to compensation even
for properly performed services for which no
compensation is apportioned.''

In taking their ''temporary leave of absence'' after
the October 17th meeting, Plaintiffs were refusing to render a full days work to their employer as was obviously
contemplated by their employment agreement. The
Plaintiff, Chatterley, testified that at this time, Interface did have sufficient business to keep all of its cm24

further, should sustain that Judgment insofar as it determines that Appellant is not subject to the penalty provisions of Section 34-28-5 ( 1), U CA, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
BETTILYON & HOW ARD
Homer F. Wilkinson
Gary A. Wes ton
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant,
Omnico, Inc.

26

I

